We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand forecast information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. We show that the manufacturer's optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then on, the two parties stick to a simple wholesale price contract with the retailer's chosen price.
Introduction
It is well known in the supply chain contracting literature that when a manufacturer (he) sells a product to a newsvendor retailer (she) who has private demand information, the manufacturer's optimal contract is a nonlinear quantity discount in which the marginal wholesale price is decreasing in the quantity purchased. Zhang et al. [2010] generalize the selling-to-newsvendor model to a multi-period model in which the retailer's dynamically arising demand/inventory information is unknown to the manufacturer. They focus on dynamic short-term contracts where contracting takes place in every period and each contract specifies the payment scheme applicable only for the upcoming period. They show that the optimal payment scheme is, in general, quite complex. Therefore, a common managerial implication from both the single-period and the multi-period models is that the manufacturer selling to a retailer is better off not using a wholesale price contract, but should instead use a more sophisticated, nonlinear payment scheme and dynamically adjust it over time. Despite these theoretical predictions, what we mostly observe in practice are simple terms of trade whereby a manufacturer sells to a retailer at a per-unit price that remains unchanged over a long time horizon. In this paper, we aim to reconcile this paradox by showing that such simple trade practice is, in fact, the best choice of a manufacturer selling to a retailer over multiple time periods when the retailer has private information about her demand.
We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer over an infinite time horizon. At the beginning of each period, the retailer observes a demand forecast containing valuable information about the random demand in the current period. Both the retailer's demand forecast and the actual realized demand at each period are privately observed by the retailer. The inventory that the retailer maintains is also assumed to be private information. The manufacturer is allowed to offer the retailer a dynamic long-term contract of his choice. The contract is dynamic because the payment charged for a given order could potentially depend on the entire history of events. The contract is long-term because it specifies the terms of trade over the entire time horizon.
Our main finding is that the manufacturer's optimal long-term contract takes a very simple form: the manufacturer offers a menu of wholesale prices and upfront payments associated with these prices; the retailer selects her preferred wholesale price, pays the associated upfront fee and, from then on, places orders with the manufacturer at the chosen wholesale price.
The intuition as to why such a simple contract is optimal can be explained as follows.
The manufacturer designs a contract with the goal of maximizing his own profits, and doing so requires the manufacturer to generate a certain amount of supply chain profits (though generally less than the maximum achieavable supply chain profits). Extracting revenue and establishing a profitable supply chain impose sometimes contradictory pressures on prices and the optimal way for the manufacturer to tradeoff revenue extraction and supply chain efficiency in a single-period problem is via a nonlinear pricing scheme. In a multi-period problem, the manufacturer has an additional flexibility: he can rearrange payments over time. The payments associated with supply chain efficiency necessarily have to take place over time in order to induce the retailer to order appropriate amounts. Any excess payments the manufacturer desires to impose for revenue extraction, however, can be freely moved in time. This gives rise to an optimal long-term contract with an up-front fee in the first period and wholesale pricing thereafter.
Our finding has several implications for the manufacturer. First, instead of using sophisticated nonlinear contract and dynamically adjusting it over time, it is in the manufacturer's best interest to sell to the retailer at a constant per-unit price with the commitment that this price does not change over time. Second, with demand information disadvantage, the manufacturer ought to let the retailer with superior demand information self-select the wholesale price at the beginning of time horizon by paying a corresponding one-time up-front fee.
Our approach of optimizing over arbitrary dynamic long-term contracts entails several risks: it could lead to a problem that would be impossible to solve or it could generate a contract that is complex, impractical or difficult to for the manufacturer to commit to.
Most contracts in the space of long-term dynamic contracts would actually have all of these drawbacks. Fortunately, the optimal contract we find in this paper is simple and easy to implement. This simplicity of the optimal contract makes it easy for the manufacturer to commit to it. That is, the optimal contract does not require the manufacturer to make contingent promises on how the price will evolve over time as a function of demand reports.
It also has good privacy properties: the retailer never needs to report information, only to select a wholesale price and, as time goes on, place quantity orders. It also does not require the manufacturer to micro-manage the retailer in the way a dynamic direct contract would.
That is, the retailer does not send reports of events to the manufacturer and then receive order quantities chosen by the manufacturer. Instead, the retailer is fully in charge of her own inventory and places orders at the time and of the size of her choosing, at a wholesale price that she also selected.
The first step in proving this result involves a relaxation approach that is a standard technique in the dynamic mechanism design literature. We consider the relaxed mechanism design problem where the only information asymmetry is about the retailer's initial demand level. For this problem, we show that it is optimal for the manufacturer to maintain the retailer's safety stock at a constant level, which depends on the retailer's initial demand forecast. Using ideas from classical multi-period inventory theory, we show that the manufacturer can achieve this by simply letting the retailer select the wholesale price to be used in all of the subsequent periods. We then show that this contract, because of its very simple structure, does not give profitable deviation opportunities to the retailer and, therefore, solves our original contract design problem.
Literature
There is an extensive literature that explores how contracts should be designed to mediate interactions among self-interested firms with private information in a supply chain (see, for example, Ha [2001] on production cost information asymmetry, Nazerzadeh and Perakis [2011] on capacity constraint information asymmetry and Cachon and Lariviere [2001],Özer and Wei [2006] , Shin and Tunca [2010] and Taylor and Xiao [2010] on demand information asymmetry). All of these papers focus on static models with one-shot operational decisions.
A finding that is relevant to our work is that in the single-period model where a manufacturer sells to a newsvendor retailer with private demand information, the manufacturer's optimal contract takes the form of a concave quantity discount where the marginal unit payment decreases in the order quantity (see, e.g., Özer and Wei [2006] and Burnetas et al. [2007] ).
The quantity discount contract can be interpreted as a menu of two-part tariffs, whereby the retailer is asked to choose a pair of wholesale price and up-front payment based on her private demand information. We extend this single-period model to a multi-period model where the asymmetric information is about demand arising dynamically over time. In this case, it becomes optimal for the manufacturer to offer a menu of two-part tariffs in the first period, and from then on, the two parties will stick to a simple wholesale pricing contract with the wholesale price chosen by the retailer in the first period.
Recently, several pioneer studies have explored the multi-period contracting problem where private information arises over time and operational decisions need to be made dynamically based on available information. Zhang et al. [2010] studies a manufacturer selling to a retailer over multiple periods with asymmetric demand and inventory information. They focus on dynamic short-term contracts and show that the optimal contracts are complex in general but may take a simple form of batch-order contracts under certain circumstances.
Compared with the multi-period model in Zhang et al. [2010] , we allow the retailer to possess private demand forecast information at the beginning of every period, while maintaining the same assumption that the realized demand (and thus inventory) in every period is the retailer's private information. Further, we broaden the contract space to allow dynamic long-term contracts, which include dynamic short-term contracts as a special case. We characterize the optimal dynamic long-term contract and show that it takes a simple form.
We are not the first to advocate the efficiency of simple contracts such as the wholesale price contract in multi-period contracting problems. Ren et al. [2010] show that a wholesale price contract, coupled with a multi-period review strategy profile, is efficient in governing a long-term repeated interaction within a supply chain with demand information asymmetry.
To reconcile the apparent conflict between the theoretical suboptimality of wholesale pricing contracts and their prevalent use in practice, a stream of experimental research has been done in controlled laboratory settings that demonstrate the wholesale price contract is more efficient than what the theory predicts (Katok and Wu [2009] , Kalkanci et al. [2011] ); the wholesale price contract has also been shown to have desirable properties from a social welfare perspective (Cui et al. [2007] ). In this regard, we identify a new appealing feature of the linear wholesale pricing when used in multi-period interactions with information asymmetry: it eliminates the informed party's incentives of misreporting demand/inventory information earlier in the hope of gaining strategic advantage in the future transactions.
Finally, our work is related to the recent literature on optimal dynamic mechanism design.
We use a relaxation approach that was first pioneered byËso and Szentes [2007] and is by now standard in the literature (see Kakade et al. [2013] , Pavan et al. [2013] or the survey by Bergemann and Said [2011] ). This technique can be used to generate a candidate ordering policy, but it does suggest a payment rule to make this ordering policy implementable. An important contribution of our paper is to use multi-period inventory theory to generate one such payment rule -wholesale pricing -that makes the ordering policy generated by the relaxation method dynamically incentive compatible. No characterization is yet known of when the relaxation method produces solutions that can be made dynamically incentive compatible -see Kakade et al. [2013] for examples of dynamic mechanism design problems that are known not to be solvable by the relaxation method. Fortunately, our supply chain contracting can indeed be solved by the relaxation approach and the solution it generates is simple and practical.
Model
We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer, who subsequently sells to consumers at a given retail price p, over an infinite number of time periods, indexed by t = 1, 2, .... In period t, the retailer has a demand forecast µ t , which deviates from the true demand by a zero-mean forecast error ε t . That is, the retailer's period t demand is D t = µ t + ε t . Both µ t and ε t are independent, identically distributed sequences of random variables and their respective cumulative probability distributions are F (·) and G(·), with densities f (·) and g(·). Let [µ, µ] be the support over which F (·) is defined and µ * be the expected demand.
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of period t, the retailer observes her inventory level x t and demand forecast µ t for that period. Second, the retailer decides the order quantity q t . We assume the order lead time is deterministic and normalize it to zero without loss of generality. The manufacturer incurs a production cost c for every unit produced. Third, the demand D t is realized. If the demand D t is higher than the retailer's available inventory x t + q t , then excessive demand is backlogged with a per-unit penalty cost b. Otherwise, leftover inventory is carried over to the next period with a per-unit holding cost h. We assume that at the first period the retailer has not yet interacted with the manufacturer and, therefore, the initial inventory level x 1 is equal to 0.
1
We assume that all demand and inventory information is private information of the retailer. That is, the manufacturer does not have access to any data on the retailer's inventory level {x t }, the retailer's demand forecast {µ t } or realized demand {D t }. That is, the manufacturer only knows the quantities he has supplied the retailer {q t } and the distributions F (·) and G(·) of the retailer's demand forecast and demand forecasting error, respectively.
The model is thus one of dynamic asymmetric information, where the retailer accumulates private inventory and demand information over time.
We study the manufacturer's problem of designing the long-term dynamic supply contract that maximizes his expected total discounted profits. The contracts we consider are longterm because they determine the terms of trade for all periods. We also say the contracts are dynamic because those terms of trade are allowed to evolve in any way of the manufacturer's choosing and are allowed to be contingent on the retailer's communication of newly observed information over time.
By the Revelation Principle for dynamic settings (see Myerson [1986] ), it is sufficient for the manufacturer to optimize among direct long-term dynamic supply contracts. A direct mechanism is one where at each period t, the retailer is asked to report her demand forecast µ t and the forecasting error ε t (the inventory level x t can be deduced from these two pieces of information together with past orders, and thus need not to be reported). We represent the period t history of realized and forecasted demand by h t and history of reports up to period t
where q t represents the quantity of units delivered by the manufacturer to the retailer in period t and T t represents the payment made by the retailer to the manufacturer in period t.
We now discuss the retailer's problem under a given contract
we describe the retailer's inventory dynamics. In period t, the retailer's starting inventory can be determined by h t and h t−1 . To see this, suppose the starting inventory in period t − 1 is determined by h t−1 and h t−2 , and denote it by x t−1 (h t−1 , h t−2 ). Clearly, the starting inventory in period t is equal to x t−1 (h t−1 , h t−2 ) plus the order quantity q t−1 ( h t−1 ) less the demand µ t−1 + ε t−1 , each of which can be determined by h t and h t−1 . Hence, given h t and h t−1 , the starting inventory in period t, denoted by x t (h t , h t−1 ), is determined by the following recursive relation:
with x 1 = 0. In period t, the order quantity is q t ( h t ), resulting in a total after-order inventory
Excluding the units that are to be used to satisfy the demand forecast µ t , the remaining inventory is x t (h t , h t−1 ) + q t ( h t )− µ t , which we call the safety stock since it will be used to hedge against the forecast error ε t . Let
It follows from Eq. (1) that the safety stock in period t can be determined by the following recursive relation:
with y 0 = ε 0 = 0.
Next we derive the recursive relation for the retailer's profit-to-go function. Consider any one period. Given the safety stock y and the forecast µ, the retailer's expected sales revenue is pµ because the forecast error ε has zero mean, and her expected holding cost is
, where z + = max{0, z}. Consequently, the retailer's expected profit (excluding the payment to the manufacturer) in the period is
. At the beginning of period t, given h t and h t−1 , if the retailer reports ε t−1 for the realized forecast error in the previous period and µ t for the forecast in the current period, then her maximum expected total discounted profit-to-go (i.e., her profit in period t plus the total discounted profits from period t + 1 onwards), denoted by Π t (h t , h t ) with h t = { h t−1 , ε t−1 , µ t }, satisfies the following Bellman equation:
where y t (h t , h t ) is determined by Eq. (2), δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, h t+1 = {h t , ε t , µ t+1 } and h t+1 = { h t , ε t , µ t+1 }.
We now turn to the manufacturer's problem. In period t, given h t and that the retailer has been following the truth-telling strategy from period 1 to t (i.e., h t = h t ), the manufacturer's profit is given by the discounted sum of the retailer's payments T t (h t ) minus the production cost cq t (h t ). Therefore, if the retailer is truthful, the manufacturer's expected total discounted profit is
where the expectation is taken over h ∞ .
To ensure truthful reporting by the retailer, the contract written by the manufacturer should satisfy dynamic incentive compatibility constraints. Specifically, in period t, given the up-to-date information h t = {h t−1 , ε t−1 , µ t } and that the retailer has previously reported her true information h t−1 , the retailer should be better off by truthfully reporting ε t−1 and µ t than reporting anything else. Mathematically,
where Π t (·, ·) is determined by Eq. (3). The (IC) constraints ensure that it is in the retailer's best interest to truthfully reveal her private information in every period given that she has always been truthful in the past. Furthermore, the contract should satisfy individual rationality constraints. Specifically, when the contract is announced at the beginning of period 1, the retailer's information consists of only the forecast for the first period demand,
i.e., h 1 = {µ 1 }. To ensure the retailer's acceptance of the contract, her expected total discounted profit Π 1 (µ 1 , µ 1 ) under truth-telling should be no less than her reservation profit, which is normalized to zero without loss of generality. Mathematically,
To summarize, the manufacturer's problem of finding the optimal direct long-term dynamic mechanism can be formulated as follows:
It is worthwhile to note that by considering long-term dynamic contracts, the space of allowable contracts is incredibly general. The fact that the contract is long-term by no means implies that it's a stationary one or that it has any other particular structure. For example, the class of short-term dynamic contracts considered in Zhang et al (10) is contained in our space of allowable contracts. That is, if it is in the interest of the manufacturer to offer the retailer a particular sequence of short-term dynamic contracts, then he is allowed to do so in our model, because there exists a long-term dynamic contract of the form
The above optimization problem might appear at first glance to be too complex to be tractable, but we show in the next section that this problem is actually solvable and the optimal solution is actually quite simple.
We make the following mild assumption on the distribution of demand forecast and forecast error: both F (·) and G(·) have an increasing failure rate, i.e., both f (·)/F (·) and g(·)/G(·) are increasing functions. The increasing failure rate assumption is satisfied by many common distributions such as the normal, uniform, and exponential distributions.
Optimal Dynamic Long-Term Contracts
We now present our solution methodology for solving the manufacturer's contract optimization problem (P). The first step in our technique is to consider a relaxation of the original problem by imposing an assumption that the manufacturer can observe all of the retailer's demand forecasts and all of the realized errors, except the demand forecast µ 1 in period 1.
We call this problem the relaxed problem. Because the manufacturer, as the contract designer, has more information that is contractible in the relaxed problem than in the original problem, the manufacturer should be no worse off under the relaxed problem, implying that solving the relaxed problem yields an upper bound on the maximum expected profit that the manufacturer can achieve under the original problem.
By the Revelation Principle, it is sufficient to look for the direct long-term dynamic contracts whereby, in period 1, the retailer reports her demand forecast µ 1 , and the order quantity and payment in every period t is specified as a function of the retailer's report µ 1 and the up-to-date demand information h
can be formally represented by the quantity-payment pair (q t (h
t , µ 1 )) for each period t ∈ N. That is, the only difference between a direct mechanism for the original problem and a direct mechanism for the relaxed problem is that, in the former, the order and payment functions take the reports of the demand forecasts and realizations as inputs, while in the latter the same functions take as inputs the initial forecast report µ 1 together with actual forecasts and demand shocks h −1 t for periods after t = 1.
Take any given direct mechanism {(q t (h
We first discuss the retailer's problem. In period t, given h t and the retailer's report µ 1 submitted in period 1, all of the demand and orders before period t are known, and so is the starting inventory in period t. We denote this inventory by x t (h t , µ 1 ), which is be determined by the following recursive relation:
with x 1 = 0. Similarly, the safety stock in period t, denoted by y t (h t , µ 1 ), is determined by a recursive relation:
Because the retailer makes only a single decision, which is what to report after observing the true demand forecast µ 1 in period 1, it suffices to characterize her expected total discounted profit for any given demand forecast µ 1 and her report µ 1 , which we denote by Π 1 (µ 1 , µ 1 ). In each period t, given h t and µ 1 , the retailer's safety stock is y t (h t , µ 1 ), implying that she earns the one-period newsvendor profit pµ t − L(y t (h t , µ 1 )) less the payment
t , µ 1 ) to the manufacturer. Consequently, we have
We now turn to the manufacturer's problem. Compared with the original problem (P), under truth-telling from the retailer, the manufacturer's profit function remains unchanged,
The (IR) constraints remain the same as well. However, the (IC) constraints are greatly simplified because only the (IC) constraints in period 1 matter now.
The relaxed problem can be formally stated as follows:
Even though the (IC') and (IR') constraints in the relaxed problem are similar to those in a single period problem, the relaxed problem (P') is still a more complex problem than a single period one since it involves selecting a potentially elaborate order policy {q t (h t )}, where order quantities are allowed to depend not only the retailer's report in period 1 but also the historical demand information h −1 t . We now provide an optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem (P'). We use the notation {(q r t (h t ), T r t (h t ))| t∈N } to represent this mechanism, where the superscript r represents the relaxed problem. Proposition 1. The following mechanism {(q r t (h t ), T r t (h t ))| t∈N } is an optimal solution of the relaxed problem (P'), where:
t (h t ) = 0 for any t ≥ 2 and any h t where s(µ 1 ) is the unique solution of the following equation
The proposition above reveals that the ordering decision in each period depends on the historical demand information in a simple and intuitive way. Specifically, in period 1, the order quantity q r 1 (µ 1 ) intended for the type-µ 1 retailer (who observed the demand forecast µ 1 ) pushes her inventory to µ 1 + s(µ 1 ), with s(µ 1 ) effectively being the safety stock to cope with the uncertain forecast error ε 1 ; in any period t ≥ 2, the order quantity q r t (h t ) is simply equal to the forecast error ε t−1 realized in the previous period t − 1 plus the current demand forecast µ t , resulting in a constant safety stock s(µ 1 ) to satisfy the forecast error ε t for the type-µ 1 retailer under truth-telling.
To see the intuition for the result that the safety stock intended for each type retailer is kept at a constant level (dependent on the retailer's type) in every period, it is useful examine the role played by the safety stock. The literature on the problem of a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer with private demand information has revealed that the tradeoff between improving system efficiency (improving the total pie of the supply chain) and limiting the retailer's information rent (shrinking the retailer's share of the total pie) determines the safety stock in a single period problem. In a multi-period setting where the only source of information asymmetry is the demand forecast in period 1, there are two reasons why the manufacturer faces the exact same tradeoff repeatedly in determining the safety stock in each period. First, since the problem is stationary, the impact of the safety stock on the system efficiency remains the same from period to period. Second, the impact of the safety stock on any type µ 1 retailer's information rents also remains the same from period to period. That is, since demand forecasts and shocks after the first period are observable to the manufacturer, the manufacturer can select the optimal resupply amount µ t + ε t−1 without paying rents to the retailer at any later period (t ≥ 2). With this reorder, the problem at period t + 1 becomes identical to the problem at period t. This way, any advantage that a high-type retailer has over a low-type retailer in period t, immediately carries over to any later period t > t. Consequently, facing the same tradeoff between efficiency and rent in every period, the manufacturer's optimal strategy is to keep the safety stock intended for type-µ 1 retailer at the constant level s(µ 1 ). Therefore, despite the fact that µ 1 is only a forecast of period 1 demand, the allocative distortion that the manufacturer generates to minimize the information rent associated with µ 1 is permanent and affects the safety stock in all periods.
Proposition 1 establishes that it is in the best interest of the manufacturer to induce the type-µ 1 retailer to follow an ordering policy so that her safety stock is kept at s(µ 1 ) in every period. This goal can be simply achieved by the manufacturer in the relaxed problem because he can dictate the order quantity in period t ≥ 2 to be equal to the sum of the realized forecast error in the previous period and the newly observed demand forecast in the current period, i.e., q r t (h t ) = µ t + ε t−1 as such information is observable to him. Thus, there is no need for transfer payments after the first period in the relaxed problem and, therefore, we can construct a solution with T r t (h t ) = 0 for all h t and t ≥ 2. However, back in the original problem, demand forecasts and realizations are no longer observable to the manufacturer, implying that the order quantities must be made contingent on the retailer's reports and triggering the need to satisfy incentive compatibility constraints in every period. However, the solution of the relaxed problem {(q r t (h t ), T r t (h t ))| t∈N } obtained in Proposition 1, with its lack of payments after the first period, will fail to induce truthtelling in the original model.
We now construct a second optimal solution of the relaxed problem that does satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints of the original problem. Since the problem (P') is a relaxation of (P), any optimal solution of (P') that is also feasible in (P) is immediately an optimal solution of (P). The technique of solving a relaxed version of the mechanism design problem and then using that solution to create a feasible solution to the original problem has been used in the literature before (seeËso and Szentes [2007] , Kakade et al. [2013] , Pavan et al. [2013] ). However, there does not exist a universal technique to create a solution to the original problem from the solution of the relaxed problem. In fact, Kakade et al. [2013] has documented instances of dynamic mechanism design problems where the relaxation method fails because such a solution does not exist. Nevertheless, we next show that the relaxation approach does work in our multi-period inventory model.
We now describe the key idea that leads to the tractability of (P) based on the solution to (P'). Our goal is to create a different contract than {(q r t (h t ), T r t (h t ))| t∈N }, but one with the same ordering policy {q r t (h t )| t∈N } and a different payment rule that properly incentivizes the retailer to order according to this ordering policy. It is known from the classical multi-period inventory theory that, to induce the retailer to follow the ordering policy that results in a constant safety stock level in every period, it is sufficient to charge the retailer a constant wholesale price for every unit of order quantity, and that there is one-to-one mapping between the desired safety stock level and the wholesale price. Specifically, to induce the retailer to order safety stock level up to s(µ 1 ), it suffices to charge the retailer w(µ 1 ) per unit of order, where
These arguments lead to the main result of this paper, which is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The following mechanism {(q
is an optimal solution of the original problem (P), where:
for any t and any h t and
for any t ≥ 2 and any h t where w(µ 1 ) is defined in Eq. (6).
What makes the dynamic adverse selection problem difficult is the requirement of satisfying the dynamic (IC) constraints which involve multiple pieces of unknown information.
Proposition 2 suggests such complicated incentive requirement can be met by offering, from period 2 onwards, a simple and time-invariant payment scheme, which is linear in the order quantity, where the order quantity is simply the sum of the retailer's report on the realized forecast error in the previous period and on the demand forecast in the current period.
Such an approach, due to its time-invariant property and linearity, greatly simplifies the complexity of the incentive requirement. Specifically, because of its time-invariant property, the retailer can no longer benefit from intentionally delaying orders in the hope for a more favorable purchase price, or ordering more than what is needed driven by the fear of higher purchase prices in the subsequent periods; similarly, the linearity property completely eliminates the retailer's incentives of upward or downward order manipulation that exist under nonlinear payment schemes. Incentives to strategically manipulate order quantities, which can be done by reporting a false realized or forecasted demand, are nonexistent when future payments are linear and time-invariant.
An implication from the result that the linear payment scheme is optimal from period 2 onwards is that the mechanism can be decomposed into two simple components: first, the manufacturer offers a family of wholesale price contracts for the retailer to choose from, each one with a different upfront payment. The retailer will select a wholesale price contract based on her period 1 forecast. The manufacturer will then supply the retailer at her chosen wholesale price. We formally establish the equivalence result in the following proposition.
Let µ * 1 (w) be the inverse function of w(µ 1 ), which is well defined because w(µ 1 ) is decreasing in µ 1 (see Eq. (6)).
Proposition 3. There exists an optimal long-term dynamic contract of the following form:
in period 1, the manufacturer offers a menu of contracts of the form {(w, T * (w))} specifying wholesale prices w and a fixed upfront payment T * (w) associated with each wholesale price, where
The retailer observing demand forecast µ 1 selects the wholesale price w(µ 1 ) and pays the up-front fee T * (w(µ 1 )). Forever after (including the first period), the supply chain operates under the wholesale contract w(µ 1 ).
For every possible forecast µ 1 of the retailer, the manufacturer will add the wholesale price w(µ 1 ) to the menu of contracts. With this contract form, instead of directly reporting her initial forecast µ 1 , the retailer simply selects the wholesale price w(µ 1 ) and, from then onwards, it will be in her best interest to maintain the safety stock associated with that wholesale price.
Discussion
In a multi-period contracting problem where private information evolves over time, one may expect that the decisions written in the optimal contract ought to be contingent on the realized historical information, which would imply that the problem is fundamentally multidimensional in nature. Consequently, the task of characterizing optimal long-term dynamic contracts would seem a priori to be quite challenging, if not impossible. Our approach -the relaxation method -is centered on an informed guess: the initial asymmetric information requires the manufacturer to pay an information rent, but private information that arrives after the contracting period might not give the retailer any edge if the manufacturer writes its contract in a smart way. From this informed guess, we are able to obtain a candidate ordering policy: if the guess is true, then the manufacturer will need the retailer to maintain a given safety stock level that is a function only of the initial demand forecast. At this point, we
can leverage the power of multi-period inventory theory that shows that maintaining a given safety stock level is easy to achieve and requires only the selection of the correct wholesale price. The simplicity of the payment rule that is needed to maintain the desired safety stock level has a very important implication: it cannot be tempered with by the retailer. That is, once the wholesale price is set, there is nothing the retailer can do to improve her fortunes except to order the desired amount of stock. This implies that the ordering policy derived from the relaxation can be made incentive compatible and, therefore, our earlier informed guess is indeed true.
Not being able to solve the dynamic mechanism design problem is not the only thing that could go wrong with our model. Our optimization problem is over an incredibly general space of contracts, many of which are not plausible in practice. Many feasible contracts are too complex to be used. Other contracts involve the manufacturer committing to complex behavior contingent on future events. In contrast, the optimal contract we found requires only committing to a single wholesale price for the long haul. That is, the optimal contract involves no contingencies whatsoever and deviations from it are thus easily verifiable. Other contracts that would be hard to implement in practice are the ones that would involve micro-managing of the retailer by the manufacturer. That is, a direct dynamic contract where the retailer simply reports her demand information and receives supplies from the manufacturer is implausible. The contracting format that we propose in Proposition 3, where the retailer selects a wholesale price of her own choosing and subsequently selects orders quantities that are also of her own choosing is far more realistic. This contracting format is also more private as it does not require the retailer to disclose any other information except how much she agrees to pay per good and how many units she wants to receive in each period.
One might wonder if the optimal contract we found requires too of an upfront payment to be practical. The upfront fee T * (w) is not always large and its size will depend on the different problems parameters. Furthermore, it is not necessary to charge T * (w) in the first period as we suggested in Proposition 3. Any sequence of payments over time for which the discounted sum of payments is T * (w) will work equally well, giving rise to a new dynamic mechanism with the same profit and the same incentive guarantees as
One simplification that we made for expositional simplicity is that we did not allow the manufacturer to choose not to enter into an agreement. That is, the manufacturer offers a contract for each type, even if some types would make the supply chain unprofitable and, hence, lead to losses for the manufacturer. This can be easily remedied: by adding a cutoff type, the manufacturer can remove the wholesale price contracts from the menu that would lead to negative profits. We also did not allow the retailer to quit the supply chain after she has signed a contract. Such dynamic individual rationality constraints can also be incorporated into our model, but they would require that we specify how backordered units are resolved if the supply chain is dissolved. To see why such dynamic individual rationality constraints do not impact the manufacturer's profits, note that he can always add extra payments upfront and return those later to the retailer. Doing so would incentivize the retailer not to leave the supply chain.
Supply chain contracting in dynamic settings is a new field and our paper leaves many open questions for future research such as what would the optimal long-term contract look like with lost sales instead of backlogging, or how would multi-period demand forecasting impact optimal long-term dynamic contracts.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is carried out in three steps.
Step 1. For any given contract that satisfies (IC') and (IR'), we use the (IC') constraints together with the envelope theorem to rewrite the retailer's profit as a function of the order quantities specified in the contract.
Step 2. The result from Step 1 allows us to express the manufacturer's profit as a function of the order quantities. We derive the optimal order quantities that maximize the manufacturer's objective without considering the constraints. We then obtain the corresponding payment scheme which, together with the unconstrained optimal order quantities, satisfies the first-order conditions of the (IC') constraints and the (IR') constraints.
Step 3.
Because we replace the (IC') constraints by their first-order necessary conditions in deriving the order quantity-payment contract in Step 2, such a contract yields an upper bound on the manufacturer's expected profit. It then suffices to verify that this contract satisfies the (IC') constraints. Our proof procedure is similar to the standard approach solving the singleperiod adverse selection, with a distinction that the retailer's order quantity in every period is allowed to depend not only on the retailer's report in period 1 but also the up-to-date realized demand information.
Step 1. Let Π 1 (µ 1 ) = Π 1 (µ 1 , µ 1 ), which is the type-µ 1 retailer's expected profit under truth-telling. It follows from the (IC') constraints and the envelope theorem that
where the expectation is taken over h −1 ∞ and the last equality is due to Eq. (5). Consequently, the type µ 1 retailer's profit is equal to
Step 2. Using the above expression for Π 1 (µ 1 ), we can rewrite the manufacturer's objective function as the total supply chain profits minus the retailer's profit, which can be rewritten as
where the second equality is obtained by replacing q t (h t ) according to Eq. (2) and the third equality is simply a rearrangement that ensures that each cy t (h t ) term appears only once in the summation, plus a replacement of µ t by its expected value µ * . Replacing Π 1 (µ 1 ) with the right-hand side of Eq. (8) and using Myerson's change of order of integration, we obtain that the manufacturer's profit is equal to
We now optimize the safety stock levels in the equation above pointwise, that is, we find the value of y t (h t ) for any t and h t . The solution to this pointwise maximization is y t (h t ) = s(µ 1 ) for any given h t , where
The maximand is strictly unimodal because its first order derivative is
which changes the sign only once because
increases in s. Hence, s(µ 1 ) is the unique solution to the following first-order condition
Therefore, the safety stock level is kept at s(µ 1 ) in every period for any µ 1 , implying that the corresponding ordering policy is {q r t (h t )} where q r 1 (µ 1 ) = µ 1 +s(µ 1 ) and q r t (h t ) = µ t +ε t−1 for t ≥ 2. Such an ordering policy, while letting Π 1 (µ) = 0, maximizes the manufacturer's objective function. The payment function can be determined by ensuring that the retailer's profit is Π 1 (µ 1 ) with Π 1 (µ) = 0, i.e.,
and the payment is zero in every subsequent period.
Step 3. Note that s(µ 1 ) increases in µ 1 , which follows from the first-order condition given in Eq. (9) and the assumption that
is a decreasing function and
is an increasing function. This implies that q r 1 (µ 1 ) increases in µ 1 . This, together with the fact that q r t (h t ) is independent of µ 1 , is sufficient to show that the contract {(q r t (·), T r t (·))| t∈N } described above satisfies the (IC') constraints, and hence solves (P').
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that the expected sum of payments at period 1 by a type µ 1 retailer under truth-telling is equal to o t (h t ))| t∈N } is thus another optimal solution of (P'). To prove that it also optimal in (P), all we need to show is that it is a feasible solution of the original problem, since (P') is a relaxation of (P).
That is, we need to show that {(q o t (h t ), T o t (h t ))| t∈N } satisfies all (IC) constraints. Consider first any (IC) constraint for t ≥ 2. Regardless of the history h t and the history of reports h t , the retailer faces a standard multi-period inventory problem with a linear ordering cost of w( µ 1 ). Since the current and future ordering cost will not be affected by any of her decisions, the retailer's optimal policy is simple: always keep a safety stock of s( µ 1 ). If the retailer has been truthful up to now, she will find herself with an inventory of s(µ 1 ) − ε t−1 and will have a demand forecast of µ t . To bring the safety stock to s(µ 1 ), the retailer will order exactly q o t (h t ) = ε t−1 + µ t . Thus, the retailer will continue to be truthful in periods t ≥ 2. Now consider the (IC) constraints for t = 1. If the retailer were to report a demand forecast µ 1 different than the true demand forecast µ 1 , the retailer's best response from then onwards would be to keep a safety stock of s( µ 1 ) -see paragraph above. By doing so, the retailer would be replicating the ordering and payment policy from a retailer who misreported µ 1 in the relaxed problem. Since this is a feasible and suboptimal deviation in the relaxed problem, it is also a feasible and suboptimal deviation in the original problem.
Proof of Proposition 3. A type-µ 1 retailer's expected total discounted profit by choosing the contract intended for type-µ 1 is Π 1 (µ 1 , µ 1 ) = E max yt(ht) ∞ t=1 δ t−1 [pµ t − L(y t (h t )) − w( µ 1 )(y t (h t ) − y t−1 (h t−1 ) + µ t )] − T * (w( µ 1 ))
where y t (h t ) is the safety stock in period t given h t . Note that the maximand is unimodal in y t (h t ). By pointwise optimization, the maximizer is at y t (h t ) = s( µ 1 ) since it satisfies the first-order conditions from the definitions of w( µ 1 ) and s( µ 1 ) that s( µ 1 ). This, together with the definition of T * (w( µ 1 )), implies that the type-µ 1 retailer's expected total discounted profit under truth-telling is
implying that
where the last equality follows from the definition of w(µ 1 ). Note that Π 1 (µ 1 , µ 1 ) = Π 1 ( µ 1 ) + (p − w( µ 1 ))(µ 1 − µ 1 ), implying that
= −[w( µ 1 )] (µ 1 − µ 1 ) (by Eq. (10)), which is nonnegative for µ 1 ≥ µ 1 and nonpositive for µ 1 ≤ µ 1 because [w( µ 1 )] ≤ 0. Therefore, it is in the best interest of type-µ 1 retailer to select the contract w(µ 1 ), implying that {w(µ 1 ), T * (w(µ 1 ))} satisfies the (IC) constraint in period 1. Clearly, the retailer's ordering quantity decisions under {w(µ 1 ), T * (w(µ 1 ))} are the same as those under the optimal direct truth-telling mechanism that solves (P) (see Proposition 2), and so is the retailer's expected total discounted profit. Therefore, these two methods achieve the same performance in expectation for the manufacturer.
